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ABSTRACT
KERBEROS SECURE PHONE MESSENGER
by
Nabeel Al-Saber
Security is becoming vital in today's open insecure Internet. While popular Internet
enabled mobile devices are spreading widely, the security of such platforms is not
maturely addressed. This research extends the popular Kerberos authentication protocol
to run on mobile phones and builds a novel Kerberos Secure Phone Messenger (KSPM)
on top of the protocol. Moreover, the Kerberos network authentication protocol provides
user authentication and message privacy with the convenience of secret key
cryptography. Such an advantage in mobile phones helps reduce the computational
burden and power consumption if compared with public key cryptography. KSPM
achieves high standards in terms of security, performance and power consumption. This
thesis explains Kerberos authentication and illustrates the software implementation of the
protocol and KSPM. Furthermore, it analyzes the performance and power consumption
required by KSPM.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation
Today, most of popular instant messaging networks are designed for scalability and
performance rather than security. The use of instant messaging in the workplace creates
potential threats to corporate computer security. Therefore, sensitive data should not be
exchanged over insecure instant messengers. The instant messaging architecture does not
provide a means for authenticating users or verifying that a message really originated
from the sender. Hence, a hacker can not only inject messages into an ongoing chat
session, but can also hijack an entire session by impersonating one of the users.
To address these security issues, major instant messaging network providers like
Microsoft, AOL, and Yahoo have announced corporate versions of their products. The
corporate versions encrypt data transmitted over the network and provide additional
functionalities such as central logging, user access controls, and corporate screen names.
As security is being recently added to desktop instant messaging, mobile phones
are not yet targeted by these new secure messengers. While smart phones are becoming
very popular with WiFi support, more security should be considered for Internet
applications. Nowadays, many corporations are using these smart phones for shipments
handling and other purposes. Hence, in the near future security will become the first
priority for these platforms.
The Kerberos Secure Phone Messenger (KSPM) introduced in this thesis is the
first mobile phone messenger that provides Kerberos security. Kerberos authentication
protocol is known as one of the best secure protocols in the literature. The main
1
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advantage of Kerberos over most of the known security protocols is using symmetric key
cryptography. As this messenger is targeted for resource limited platforms (mobile
phones), symmetric key cryptography is the best choice for providing security.

1.2 Objectives
This research intends to build a secure messenger for mobile phones using Kerberos
protocol. The application should not only be secure but it should also be designed to
provide performance efficiency. The resulting application is designed to provide
functionalities for home users and corporations users.

The main objectives behind this thesis are the following:
•

Implement Kerberos security protocol on mobiles.

•

Build KSPM using Kerberos protocol.

•

Analyze the performance, memory and power requirements for KSPM.

1.3 Organization
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 states the motivation and objectives behind
this research. Chapter 2 examines the literature review of the Kerberos protocol, it's
advantages and benefits. Chapter 3 discusses the software implementation of the project.
Chapter 4 analyzes the performance, memory and power requirements for KSPM.
Finally, Chapter 5 presents conclusions and future research directions.

CHAPTER 2
KERBEROS PROTOCOL

The Kerberos Network Authentication Service [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] provides the means of
verifying the identities of principals on an open, potentially insecure network. It allows
individuals communicating over an insecure network to prove their identity to one
another in a secure manner. The Kerberos Authentication Service was developed by the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to protect the emerging network services
provided by Project Athena [2]. Versions 1 through 3 were used internally. Although
designed primarily for use by Project Athena, Version 4 of the protocol has achieved
wide spread use beyond MIT. Version 5, defined in RFC 1510, of the Kerberos protocol
incorporates new features suggested from experience with Version 4, making it useful in
more situations. Version 5 was based in part upon input from many contributors familiar
with Version 4.
Kerberos prevents eavesdropping or replay attacks, and ensures the integrity of
the data. Its designers aimed primarily at a client-server model, and it provides mutual
authentication where both the user and the server verify each other's identity [3]. This
chapter describes Kerberos model and basic protocol exchanges.

2.1 Kerberos Infrastructure
The Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC), tickets, keys, and other terminologies are
explained in this section. Kerberos works on the basis of "tickets" which serve to prove
the identity of users. The KDC maintains a database of secret keys; each entity on the
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network, whether a client or a server, shares a secret key known only to itself and to the
KDC. Knowledge of this key serves to prove an entity's identity. For communication
between two entities, the KDC generates a session key which they can use to secure their
interactions. The three main parts of the Kerberos Physical infrastructure are: KDC, client
user and server with the desired service to access.

Figure 2.1 Kerberos authentication [3].

2.1.1 Key Distribution Server (KDC)
KDC is the heart and soul of the complete Kerberos infrastructure. The KDC consists of
three logical components [4]: a database of all principals and their associated encryption
keys, the Authentication Server, and the Ticket Granting Server. While each of these
components is logically separate, they are usually implemented in a single program and
run together in a single process space.
In a given Kerberos realm, there must be at least one KDC. Vital data including
the secrets for every principal in the realm is located on every KDC in the network. Thus,
it is critical that those servers should be as secure as possible. Each KDC contains a
database of all of the principals contained in the realm, as well as their associated secrets.
Most KDC software also stores additional information for each principal in this database,
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such as password lifetimes, last password change, and more. Windows 2000 and 2003
keep this database in the Active Directory, its LDAP store.
2.1.1.1 KDC Architecture. KDC is divided into two parts based on functionality. Each
part provides services to the other part. The two parts are the Authentication Server (AS)
and Ticket Granting Server (TGS).
Authentication Server (AS) [4] issues an encrypted Ticket Granting Ticket (also
known as a TGT) to clients who wish to login to the Kerberos realm. The client does not
have to prove its identity to the KDC; instead, the TGT that is sent back to the client is
encrypted in the user's password. Since only the user and the KDC know the user's
password, when the login process attempts to decrypt the ticket using the password
supplied by the user, only the correct password will correctly decrypt the ticket. If an
incorrect password is used, the ticket will decrypt into garbage, and the user is prompted
to try again. The TGT returned by the Authentication Server can then be used, once
decrypted by the client, to request individual service tickets. The TGT is the crucial piece
that eliminates the requirement for a user to retype their password for each subsequent
service they contact.
Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) [4] issues tickets for admission to other services
in the TGS' s domain. When a client wants access to a service, it must contact the ticketgranting service in the service's account domain, present a TGT, and ask for a ticket. The
Ticket Granting Server takes in two pieces of data from the client: a ticket request that
includes the principal name representing the service the client wishes to contact, and a
Ticket Granting Ticket that has been issued by the Authentication Server. The TGS
verifies the TGT is valid and then issues the user the service ticket he requested.
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2.1.1.2 KDC Advantages and Disadvantages.

The main advantage of using a KDC

is that it makes key distribution much easier. If any node wants to join the network, we
just need to setup a Key between the node and the KDC. Also in case some node is
suspected of being compromised, the setup again needs to be changed for just one place.
The alternative to KDC will be for nodes to share keys between themselves depending on
what service they may need to access.

Although KDC authentication has its advantages [5], it has disadvantages as well.
•

The KDC has enough information to impersonate any one on the network so if it
is compromised all the network resources are open to attack.

•

The KDC is the single point of failure. If it goes down nobody can access
anything [5].

•

The KDC can become a bottleneck as far as performance is concerned, because
everyone frequently needs to access it. Having multiple KDC's can alleviate this
problem, but then again the complexity may be an issue.

After understanding the basics of the Kerberos architecture, the next section goes
deeper and takes a look at the logical infrastructure, the key structure, the ticket types,
etc. The various physical components of Kerberos contain a number of logical attributes
which are of prime importance for Kerberos to work properly.
Kerberos authentication relies on several keys and key types for encryption. Key
types can include long-term symmetric keys, long-term asymmetric keys, and short-term
symmetric keys. The authentication protocol was designed to use symmetric encryption,
meaning that the same shared key is used by the sender and the recipient for encryption
and decryption.
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2.1.2 Kerberos Keys
To authenticate entities, Kerberos uses symmetric key cryptography. In symmetric key
cryptography, the communicating entities use the same key for both encryption and
decryption. The basic mathematical equation behind this process is the following:

DK(EK(M))

M

(2.1)

If the encryption (E) and decryption (D) processes are both using the same key K,
the decryption of the encrypted text (M) results in the readable text (M). There are two
types of keys in Kerberos: long-term symmetric keys and short-term symmetric keys.
The master key (long-term symmetric key) [6] is a secret key that is shared
between each entity and the KDC. It must be known to both the entity and the KDC
before actual Kerberos protocol communication can take place. The master key is
generated as part of the domain enrollment process and is derived from the user, machine,
or service's password. The transport of the master key over a communication channel is
secured using a secure channel.

The master keys (long-term symmetric keys).

•

User keys -When a user is created, his/her password is used to create the user
key. In the KDC domain, the user key is stored with the user's object in the
KDC. At the workstation, the user key is created when the user logs on [6].

•

System keys - When a workstation or a server joins a Kerberos domain, it
receives a password. Similar to a user account, the system account's password is
used to create the system key [6].

•

Service keys - Services use a key based on the account password used to log on.
All KDC's in the same realm use the same service key [6].
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Short-term symmetric keys are session keys [6]. A session key is a secret key that
is shared between two entities for authentication purposes. The session key is generated
by the KDC. Because it is a critical part of the Kerberos authentication protocol, it is
never sent in the clear over a communication channel: It is encrypted using the master
key. The session keys used for ticket-granting tickets (TGTs) and service tickets are
short-lived, and used only as long as that session or service ticket is valid.

2.1.3 Kerberos Tickets

The main component of Kerberos authentication is the ticket. A Kerberos ticket [5] is an
encrypted data structure issued by the KDC that includes a shared encryption key, unique
to each session, along with other fields. Tickets serve two purposes: to confirm the
identity of the end participants and to establish a short-lived encryption key that both
parties can share for secure communications (called the session key). There are two types
of tickets, used in Kerberos authentication as explained below, TGTs and service tickets.
2.1.3.1 Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT). The KDC responds to a client's

authentication service request by returning a service ticket for it. This special service
ticket is called a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) [4, 6]. A TGT enables the authentication
service to safely transport the requester's credentials to the ticket-granting service.
The TGTs are encrypted with a key shared by the KDC. The client cannot read
tickets. Only KDC servers can read TGTs to secure access to user credentials, session
keys, and other information. Like an ordinary service ticket, a TGT contains a copy of the
session key that the KDC will use in communicating with the client. The TGT is
encrypted with the KDC's long-term key.
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Clients use the TGT to request a service ticket when accessing a certain service.
Before a client attempts to connect to any service, the client first checks its credentials
cache for a service ticket to that service. If it does not have one, it checks the cache again
for a TGT. If it finds a TGT, the client fetches the corresponding TGS session key from
the cache, uses this key to prepare an authenticator, and sends both the authenticator and
the TGT to the KDC, along with a request for a service ticket.
The KDC uses the TGT to avoid the performance penalties of looking up a user's
long term key every time the user requests a service. The KDC looks up the user's longterm key only once, when it grants an initial TGT. For all other exchanges with this
client, the KDC can decrypt the TGT with its own long-term key, extract the session key,
and use that to validate the client's authenticator.
2.1.3.2 Service Tickets. A service ticket [4, 6] enables the ticket-granting service
(TGS) to safely transport the requester's credentials to the target server or service. The
KDC responds to the client's request to connect to a service by sending both copies of the
session key to the client. The client's copy of the session key is encrypted with the key
that the KDC shares with the client. The service's copy of the session key is embedded,
along with information about the client, in a data structure called a service ticket. The
entire structure is then encrypted with the key that the KDC shares with the service. The
ticket is the client's responsibility to manage until it contacts the service.
A service ticket is used to authenticate with services other than the TGS and is
meant only for the target service. A service ticket is encrypted with a service key, which
is a long-term key shared by the KDC and the target service. Thus, although the client
manages the service ticket, the client cannot read it. Only the KDC and the target service
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can read tickets, enabling secure access to user credentials, the session key, and other
information. One thing to note here is that the KDC is simply providing a ticket-granting
service. It does not keep track of its messages to make sure they reach the intended
address. No harm will be done if the KDC's messages fall into The wrong hands. Only
someone who knows the client's secret key can decrypt the client's copy of the session
key. Only someone who knows the server's secret key can read what is inside the ticket.
When the client receives the KDC's reply, it extracts the ticket and the client's copy of the
session key, putting both aside in a secure cache (located in volatile memory, not on
disk). When the client wants admission to the server, it sends the server a message that
consists of the ticket, which is still encrypted with the server's secret key, and an
authenticator, which is encrypted with the session key. The ticket and authenticator
together are the client's credentials to the server. To guard against the possibility that
someone might steal a copy of a ticket, service tickets have an expiration time that is
specified by the KDC in the ticket's data structure.
2.1.3.3 Client's Tickets Information. A client needs to have some information
about what is inside tickets and TGTs in order to manage its credentials cache. When the
KDC returns a ticket and session key as the result of an authentication service (AS) or
ticket-granting service (TGS) exchange, it packages the client's copy of the session key in
a data structure that includes the information in the following ticket fields: Authentication
Time, Start Time, End Time, and Renew Till [6]. In order to reduce the risk that a ticket
or the corresponding session key might be compromised, administrators can set the
maximum lifetime for tickets. The maximum lifetime for ticket setting is an element of
the Kerberos policy.
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2.1.4 Realms, Principals, and Instances
Every entity contained within a Kerberos installation, including individual users,
computers, and services running on servers, has a principal [4] associated with it. Each
principal is associated with a long-term key. This key can be, for example, a password or
pass phrase. Principals are globally unique names. To accomplish this, the principal is
divided into a hierarchical structure.
Every principal starts with a username or service name. The username or service
name is then followed by an optional instance. The instance [4] is used in two situations:
for service principals (which well discuss later), and in order to create special principals
for administrative use. For example, administrators can have two principals: one for dayto-day usage and another (an "admin" principal) to use only when the administrator needs
elevated privileges.
The username and optional instance, taken together, form a unique identity within
a given realm [4]. Each Kerberos installation defines an administrative realm of control
that is distinct from every other Kerberos installation. Kerberos defines this as the realm
name. By convention, the Kerberos realm for a given DNS is the domain converted in
uppercase.

2.2 Kerberos Operation
Before going into the details of Kerberos message exchange, we look at how basic
Kerberos authentication works. In the next section, each and every step is explained in
detail.
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The Kerberos authentication steps [1] ( Figure 2.2):
•

A client authenticates itself to the KDC by sending the pre authentication data.

•

The KDC sends the TGT which can be used by the client to authenticate itself in
the following transactions.

•

A client sends a request to the authentication server (AS) for the "credentials" of
a given server.

•

The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted with the client's key. The
credentials consist of a "ticket" for the server and a temporary encryption key or
a "session key".

•

The client transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a copy of
the session key, all encrypted with the server's key) to the server.

•

The session key (now shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the
client and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also be used
to encrypt further communications between the two parties or to exchange a
separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further communication.
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Figure 2.2 Basic Kerberos message exchange.

The Basic Kerberos exchange is divided into 3 parts:
•

Authentication Server (AS) exchange

•

Ticket Granting Server (TGT) exchange

•

Client/ Server Exchange
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2.2.1 Authentication Server (AS) Exchange
Kerberos Authentication Service Request (KRB_AS_REQ)
The client contacts the KDC's authentication service for a short-lived ticket (TGT). This
is done at login. The Kerberos client on the workstation sends the message
KRB_AS _REQ to the KDC.

Figure 2.3 Kerberos authentication service [6].

The message includes [1]:
•

The user principal name.

•

The name of the account domain.

•

Pre-authentication data encrypted with the user's key derived from the user's
password.
The KDC has a copy of the user's key in its account database (i.e. Microsoft

Active Directory). When it receives a request from the Kerberos client on the user's
workstation, it takes the user key from a field in the record. This process of computing
one copy of the key from a password and fetching another copy of the key from a
database actually takes place only once, when a user initially logs on to the network.
Immediately after accepting the user's password and deriving the user's long-term key,
the Kerberos client on the workstation requests a service ticket and a TGS session key
that it can use in subsequent transactions with the KDC during this logon session.
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The optional pre-authentication data is used to verify the user during the login
session. The KDC decrypts the pre-authentication data and evaluates the embedded
timestamp. If the timestamp passes the test, the KDC can be assured that the preauthentication data was encrypted with the user key and thus it can verify that the user is
genuine. After it has verified the user's identity, the KDC creates credentials that the
Kerberos client on the workstation can present to the ticket-granting service.

Kerberos Authentication Service Response (KRB_AS_REP)
The AS constructs the TGT and creates a session key that the client can use to encrypt
communications with the ticket-granting service (TGS) [1]. The TGT has a limited
lifetime. At the point that the client has received the TGT, the client has not been granted
access to any resources, even to resources on the local computer.
The KDC replies with KRB__AS_REP [6] containing a service ticket (TGT) for
itself. This TGT contains a copy of the session key that the service (KDC) will use in
communicating with the user. The message that returns the TGT to the user also includes
a copy of the session key that the user can use in communicating with the KDC. The TGT
is encrypted with the KDC's long-term key. The user's copy of the session key is
encrypted with the user's long-term key.

The message includes [1, 6]:
•

A TGS session key for the user to use with the TGS, encrypted with the user key
derived from the user's password.

•

A TGT for the KDC encrypted with the TGS key (KDC master key). The TGT
includes a TGS session key for the KDC to use with the user and authorization
data for the user.
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When the client receives the KDC's reply to its initial request, the client uses its
cached copy of the user key to decrypt its copy of the session key. It can then discard the
user key derived from the user's password, for it is no longer needed. In all subsequent
exchanges with the KDC, the client uses the TGS session key. Like any other session
key, this key is temporary, valid only until the TGT expires or the user logs off. For this
reason, the TGS session key is often called a logon session key.

2.2.2 The Ticket-Granting Service Exchange
Kerberos Ticket-Granting Service Request (KRB_TGS_REQ)
When the client wants to access a service, it sends a request to the TGS for a ticket. This
ticket is referred to as a service ticket. To get the ticket, the client presents the TGT, an
authenticator, and the name of the target server.

The message includes [1, 6]:
•

The name of the target computer.

•

The name of the target computer's domain.

•

The user's TGT.

•

An authenticator encrypted with the session key the user shares with the KDC.
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Kerberos Ticket-Granting Service Response (KRB_TGS_REP)
The TGS examines the TGT and the authenticator. Then, the TGS creates a sub-session
key for the user to share with the computer encrypted with the session key. The message
also includes a service ticket to the computer, encrypted with the computer's secret key.
The service ticket includes: A session key for the computer to share with the user and
authorization data copied from the user's TGT.

The KRB _TGS _ REP [1, 6] message includes:
•

A session key for the user to share with the computer encrypted with the session
key the user shares with the KDC.

•

The user's service ticket to the computer, encrypted with the computer's secret
key.

•

The service ticket includes: A session key for the computer to share with the
user, and authorization data copied from the user's TGT.

2.2.3 The Client/Server Exchange
Kerberos application server request (KRB_AP_REQ)
After the client has the service ticket, the client sends the ticket and a new authenticator
to the target server (Bob), requesting access. The server will decrypt the ticket and
validate the authenticator.
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Figure 2.5 Kerberos application server [6].

This message contains [1, 6]:
•

An application option flag indicating whether to use the session key.

•

An application option flag indicating whether the client wants mutual
authentication.

•

The service ticket obtained in the TGS exchange.

•

An authenticator encrypted with the session key for the service.

Kerberos application server response (optional) (KRB_AP_REP)
Optionally, the client might request that the target server verify its own identity. This is
called mutual authentication. If mutual authentication is requested, the target server will
take the client computer's timestamp from the authenticator, encrypt it with the session
key the TGS provided for client-target server messages, and send it to the client.
If the authenticator passes the test, the service looks for a mutual authentication
flag in the client's request. If the flag is set, the service uses the session key to encrypt the
time from the user's authenticator and returns the result in a Kerberos application reply
(KRB _AP_REP). If the flag is not set, then no response is needed. When the client on the
user's workstation receives KRB_AP_REP, it decrypts the service's authenticator with

19
the session key it shares with the service and compares the time returned by the service
with the time in the client's original authenticator. If the times match, the client knows
that the service is genuine [6].

2.3 Kerberos Services and Benefits
Kerberos provides various services like authentication, authorization, data integrity and
confidentiality. Moreover, there are many benefits of using Kerberos. All of this is
discussed below.

2.3.1 Kerberos Services
Authentication [4] is the process of verifying the identity of a particular user. To
authenticate a user, the user is asked for information that would prove his identity. This
information can fall into one or more of three categories: what he knows, what he has, or
what he is. Kerberos provides this using the trusted third party concept. It also provides
mutual authentication by which the server trusts the client as well the client trusts the
server. At a very simple level, Kerberos uses encryption technology. The user's password
is utilized (while still on the user's workstation) to generate an encryption key. The key
encrypts certain pieces of information that are exchanged with the KDC. After a few
exchanges, the KDC returns information to the user that is usable only by software on the
workstation that knows the temporary encryption key derived from the password. Now
when users wish to contact a Kerberos-protected service, they first contact the Kerberos
ticket-granting service and ask for a ticket to the service. A ticket is a chunk of
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information that proves the user's identity to the service; but it's encrypted in the services'
long-term key, so it's unintelligible to the user.
Authorization [3] refers to granting or denying access to specific resources based
on the requesting user's identity. This step is performed after a user is identified through
authentication. Authorization is usually performed through access control lists, which
associate user identities with specific rights. Authorization includes information such as a
user's group membership, user policies, and other information that determines what level
of access that user has to computer or network resources. By default, Kerberos does not
provide any authorization services; they are usually implemented as a separate procedure.
Still authorization information can be embedded within the TGS. A usual way of doing
this in Kerberos is to include access control lists in the ticket that the KDC sends to the
client for the server. Once the server decrypts the ticket it has a list of services that this
particular client can access and their privilege level. The server uses these ACL's to
authorize the servers future requests for resources.
Data integrity [3] ensures the recipient that the message was not tampered with
during transit. While encryption as used in Kerberos gives you message integrity for
"free," since only the two end points have the required key to encrypt and decrypt
messages, there are specialized message-integrity algorithms that can ensure message
integrity without the overhead of encryption. There are several different messageintegrity algorithms commonly used in Kerberos. Ranging from weaker to stronger, the
message-integrity algorithms included in the MIT Kerberos distribution include CRC-32,
MD5, and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA1).
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Confidentiality [3] ensures that certain information is never disclosed to
unauthorized entities. Sometimes, you need to know that the conversation is completely
private. A more technical term for privacy is "data confidentiality" and once again
Kerberos addresses this need. Kerberos provides services that encrypt the entire plaintext
message and (optionally) computes a one-way hash of the cipher text. The sender
transmits the package to the receiver, who decrypts the cipher text and (optionally)
verifies the authenticity of the data. Usually, if we are encrypting the whole message for
confidentiality we use the data integrity feature as well.

2.3.2 Kerberos Benefits
Kerberos has a number of advantages as an authentication protocol. This section lists a
number of reasons which act as the main driving points for using Kerberos.

1) Faster Authentication
The Kerberos protocol uses a unique ticketing protocol that provides faster authentication
[7]. Every authenticated domain entity can request tickets from its local Kerberos KDC to
access other domain resources. The tickets are considered as access permits by the
resource servers. The ticket can be used more than once and can be cached on the client
side. Hence, Kerberos is described as a Single Sign On protocol. The use of tickets makes
the re-authentication of the client much easier. Once a client has a ticket from the KDC, it
can be used again and again for authentication.
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2) Mutual Authentication
Kerberos supports mutual authentication where not only the client authenticates itself to
the server but the server can also authenticate to the client [7]. So there is no assumption
made that the servers are always trustworthy.

3) Open Source
Kerberos is an open source protocol, thus essentially free to use [2]. Because of being
open source, there is also much faster development going on all the fronts and it is being
used and tested by large user base.

4) Support for Authentication Delegation
Delegation means that user A can give rights to an intermediary machine B to
authenticate to an application server C as if machine B was user A. This means that
application server C will base its authorization decisions on user A's identity rather than
on machine B's account. Delegation is also known as authentication forwarding. In
Kerberos terminology, this basically means that user A forwards a ticket to intermediary
machine B, and that machine B then uses user A's ticket to authenticate to application
server C [7].

5) Support for Public Key Cryptography and One Time Pass Codes
Kerberos can support the use of public key cryptography for authentication of the client
to the KDC; this way the password guessing/stealing attacks can be minimized. Another
solution that Kerberos provides for such issues is to use one time passcodes or smart
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cards where each time to authenticate the user requires a different password so that a
password guessing mechanism or a Trojan horse program will never work as the
password changes at each login.

CHAPTER 3
SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter describes the software that empowers the system. Several object-oriented
modeling techniques are presented in this chapter. This includes class diagrams, members
and methods.

3.1 Kerberos Secure Phone Messenger (KSPM) Architecture
3.1.1 Instant Messaging Architecture
Instant messaging follows the client-server architecture. Communication between clients
occurs either via a server, or a server brokers it. This section describes the general
architecture of instant messaging networks and clients. There are two main ways
messages and files are transferred between clients: server proxy and server broker.

1) Server Proxy
In the server proxy architecture [8], all instant messaging communication is passed
through the server. For example, if two users, Alice and Bob, want to exchange messages
via instant messaging, they would not send the messages directly to each other. Instead,
the messages would first be sent to the server. The server would then forward the
message to the intended recipient. In this case, the server acts as a proxy between the
users.
The benefit of this method is that both clients initiate outgoing connections to the
server and either one does not require the ability to accept incoming connections on a
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port that a corporate firewall may block. However, sending messages to the server may
incur a time delay. In general, this is the default method that all major instant messaging
networks use today.

2) Server Broker

In the server broker architecture [8], the only packets that are sent to the server are
packets requesting the server to initiate communication between two clients. The server
essentially facilitates the connection between the two clients. The server provides the
clients with the connection information; the clients then directly connect to one another.
For example, if Alice wants to send a message to Bob, Alice will send a request to
the server to initiate the session. The server will notify Bob that Alice wishes to chat with
him. If Bob agrees, he replies to the server with his contact information (typically an IP
address and port number) and this information is forwarded to Alice. Then, Alice can
directly connect to Bob and messages between the two do not pass via the server.
This method reduces the load on the server and reduces the privacy risk, as
potentially confidential messages are no longer sent to the central server. However, this
method is often blocked by firewalls, as they are usually configured to not allow
incoming connections. Yahoo! Instant Messenger (YIM) is an example of a client that
uses server brokering. YIM will send the first message via the server and then attempt a
direct connection. If the direct connection fails, YIM will continue to send messages via
the server.
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3.1.2 Kerberos Secure Phone Messenger (KSPM) Architecture
KSPM looks like a typical phone to phone messenger for the users. The underlying
technology for this messenger is based on Kerberos authentication. Kerberos provides a
mechanism for mutual authentication between a client and a server on an open insecure
network. All communications after the authentication will be encrypted and secure.
KSPM is divided into two main parts. The first part is the messenger running on
the phone. The second part is the server messenger application running on the server. All
communications from phone to phone go through the messenger server as described in
the server proxy architecture. After the clients authenticate with the active directory using
Kerberos, the keys are passed to the messenger server. When the client wants to
communicate with another client, the message is sent to the messenger server. The
messenger server application decrypts the message using the sub-session key for client
one. Then, it encrypts the message using the sub-session key for client two and sends it.
The server also keeps a log of all communications between the clients. Figure 3.1 shows
the authentication with the active directory, and the communications between the clients
and server.
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Figure 3.1 Application architecture.

3.2 KSPM Software Implementation
KSPM was written using the Java programming language. The java version for mobile
phones platform is called Java 2 Platform Micro Edition (J2ME). It is designed for small,
resource-constrained devices such as cell phones. The phone operating system is
windows mobile version 5.0. In order to run Java, a virtual machine is required. The only
available smartphone JVM in the market is WebSphere Everyplace Micro Edition Java
(WEME) by IBM [9]. The Kerberos protocol basic functions were written using
Connected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC) [10]. CLDC defines the base set of
application programming interfaces and a virtual machine for resource-constrained
devices. However, the newer version Connected Device Configuration (CDC) supports
more complex libraries. KSPM is written using CDC to provide advanced functionalities
and a better user interface while still being able to reuse the Kerberos CLDC version. The
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KSPM application has four classes: Kerberos client, Kerberos key, Kerberos ticket, main
and communications. The following sections describe the implementation of the
software.

3.2.1 KSPM Kerberos Client
Kerberos Client Class

Import: BounctyCastle. crypto
Extends: ASN1DataTypes
This class implements the main functions of the Kerberos authentication protocol. All
other sub-functions are used in these main functions. It is responsible for establishing
authentication, processing tickets and keys, and encrypting/decrypting messages. Figure
3.2 shows the class diagram and its members.
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Table 3.1 Main Functions Description

Authoring and Processing a TGT Request
The basic purpose of the getTicketResponse function is to author a request for a Kerberos
ticket (a TGT or a service ticket), send the ticket request to the Kerberos server, get a
response from the server, and extract the ticket and the session key from the response. In
other words, the first time this method is called, it authors the KRB_AS_REQ message
and extracts the ticket and the session key from the KRB AS REP message. Notice steps
1 and 2 in Figure 3.3.

Processing and Authoring a Service Ticket
After the TGT response is processed to extract the TGT and the session key, a request for
service ticket from the KDC server is made. The same TGT request (getTicketResponse
method) is used to obtain a service ticket. This time the method is called to author a
KRB TGS REQ message, and extract the service ticket and sub-session key from the
KRB_TGS_REP message. Notice steps 3 and 4 in Figure 3.3.
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Processing Error Messages
The method getError catches any error messages received by the server. It processes the
message, then displays the error description. The Kerberos error codes are well defined in
[1]. Using these error codes, the reason of the error can be discovered and resolved easily.
For example, the time synchronization error occurs very frequently when authenticating
with Windows. The time should be corrected and the rejected message should be sent
again stamped with the server's time. Notice the error message between steps 3 and 4 in
Figure 3.3

Creating a Kerberos Session
The sub-session key and the service ticket are the two things required to establish a
secure communications context with the messenger server. At this point the Kerberos
client must author a context establishment request intended for the messenger server. The

createKerberosSession method handles the following aspects of establishing a secure
communication context with the messenger server: authoring the context establishment
request, sending the request to the server, fetching a response from the server, parsing the
response to check whether the remote server has agreed to the context establishment
request, and returning if the session establishment was successful or not. Notice messages
KRB_AP_REQ and KRB_AP_REP in steps 5 and 6 in Figure 3.3.
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Sending a Secure Message to the Messenger Server
The createKerberosSession method returns a true value if the client has successfully
established a secure session with the remote Kerberos server. To exchange messages with
the messenger server use the sendSecureMessage method. This method takes the
following parameters: a plain text message, a cryptographic key, a sequence number
(which uniquely identifies the message being sent), and input and output stream objects
to exchange data with the server. The sendSecureMessage method authors a secure
message, sends the message to the server over the output stream, listens for a response
from the server, and returns the server's response.
The message sent to the server is secured using the sub-session key. This means
that only the intended recipient (the messenger server, which has the sub-session key) is
capable of decrypting and understanding the message. Moreover, the secure message
contains message integrity data, so the messenger server can verify the integrity of the
message coming from the client.

Decoding the Server Message
The messenger server reply is secure; only the client possessing the sub-session key can
decrypt the message. Method decodeSecureMessage takes a secure message along with a
decryption key, decrypts the message, checks the data integrity and returns the plain text
form of the message.
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Figure 3.3 Messages exchange for Kerberos authentication.
3.2.2 KSPM Kerberos Key
➢

Kerberos Key Class

Import: BouncyCastle. crypto
The class has all the functions required to handle Kerberos keys. It is responsible for
generating the user master key which is derived from the user's password. Figure 3.4
shows the class diagram.
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Figure 3.4 Kerberos key class members.

Kerberos defines an algorithm for processing a user's password to produce a
secret key. On the Kerberos client, the Bouncy Castle cryptographic library [11] is used
for encryption and for generating a secret Kerberos key from the user's password. Bouncy
Castle is a collection of APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) used in
cryptography.
For the J2ME-based Kerberos client, DES (data encryption standard) is used in
the CBC (cipher block chaining) mode. DES is an encryption algorithm where the data to
be encrypted (plain text) and the secret key are passed as inputs to the encryption process.
The key and the plain text are processed together according to the DES algorithm to
produce the encrypted (cipher text) form of the plain text data.
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3.2.3 KSPM Kerberos Ticket
Kerberos Ticket and Key Class

This class stores Kerberos tickets and keys. It functions as a cache for the retrieved
tickets during authentication. Whenever keys or tickets (TGT and service tickets) are
required, they can be retrieved from this cache. Figure 3.5 shows the class diagram.

Figure 3.5 Ticket and key class members.

3.2.4 KSPM Main and Communications

➢ Kerberos Main Class
➢ Kerberos Receive Thread
➢ Kerberos Send Thread

The main class runs all other classes, initiates send and receive connection threads and
also draws the user interface. The connection parameters, such as the user name, user
password, realm, server name, server IP address and service ports, are set in this class.
Parameters like the user name, user password, and realm are inserted at run time by the
GUI interface. Other parameters like the server IP address and port number are hardcoded.
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Connections in this class are separated into two groups:
•

The first connection authenticates the client with the server (Active Directory).
It establishes a UDP connection to a well known service port number 88 in the
Microsoft server. After the authentication is done, the connection is closed but it
can be reopened if the client requires any new tickets from the server. In this
connection, the first four authentication messages are exchanged as shown in
Figure 3.3.

•

The second connection is between the client and the messenger server. It
establishes a TCP connection to a predefined port number. Then, the connection
is migrated to another port to keep the first port free for other clients' connection
requests. Further messages between clients are exchanged using this connection.

Before the connection takes place, the user's name and password should be
already stored in the Active Directory on the server. The messenger server should also be
running to complete the connection. The next section will provide an overview of the
messenger server implementation.

3.3 Messenger Server Implementation

Import: javax. security. auth
java. net. ServerSocket
org. ietf.jgss
The messenger server runs on the Windows server as an intermediate point between
clients. It was developed using Java 2 Platform Enterprise Edition (J2EE). The
application consists of five classes described later in this section. Figure 3.6 shows the
class diagram.
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Figure 3.6 Messenger server application classes and members.

Figure 3.7 shows the main structure of the application. The application is built
using object oriented approach. Each class has a certain function as explained later. Calls
between classes are also clear in the figure. The class MessengerServerAuth can initiate
multiple clients by calling the RunMessengerClientAuth class.
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MessengerServer (Main)

MessengerServerAuth
JAAS (Authentication)

RunMessengerClientAuth

RunMessengerClientAuth

MessengerClientAuth
GSS (PrivilegedAction)

MessengerClientAuth
GSS (PrivilegedAction)

v
Receive

Receive

Figure 3.7 Messenger server application classes diagram.
3.3.1 Messenger Server Class
➢

MessengerServer Class

Extends. javax.swing.JFrame
-

This is the main class. It initializes and runs the JFrame display. It also calls the
MessengerServerAuth class to start the authentication process.

39
3.3.2 MessengerServerAuth Class
MessengerServerAuth Class
This class authenticates and authorizes the messenger server with active directory using
the Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) [12]. JAAS can be used for
two purposes: for the authentication of users, to reliably and securely determine who is
currently executing Java code, and for the authorization of users to ensure they have the
access control rights (permissions) required to do security-sensitive operations.
The JAAS uses the LoginContext class to provide the basic methods used to
authenticate Subjects. It also allows an application to be independent of the underlying
authentication technologies. The LoginContext consults a configuration that determines
the authentication services or LoginModules configured for a particular application.

Kerberos Login Module
The class com.sun.security.auth.module.Krb5LoginModule is Sun's implementation of a
login module for the Kerberos version 5 protocol. After authentication, the TGT is stored
in the Subject's private credentials set and the Kerberos principal is stored in the Subject's
principal set. The login modules invoked by JAAS must be able to get information from
the caller for authentication using Callback handler. For example, the Kerberos login
module may require users to enter their Kerberos password for authentication. After
authenticating using JAAS, the class starts the MessengerClientAuth class whenever a
new client wants to communicate with the messenger server.
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3.3.3 MessengerClientAuth Class

➢

MessengerClientAuth Class

Implements.. java.security.PrivilegedAction
The Java Generic Security Services Application Program Interface GSS-API [12] defined
in RFC 2853 is used for securely exchanging messages between communicating
applications. The GSS-API offers application programmers uniform access to security
services atop a variety of underlying security mechanisms, including Kerberos.
The GSS-API is used in this class to start a Kerberos server that can accept
incoming authentication requests from clients; provided that the client has already
authenticated with the active directory and obtained the required credentials to
authenticate with the messenger server. When the GSS-API creates the session as
described in the steps below, the class starts a Receive class to keep listening for any
incoming packets from the client.

Generic Security Services Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
The Java GSS-API framework security related functionality is obtained from
GSSManager. The GSSManager can be used to configure new providers [12]. The
GSSManager also serves as a factory class for three important interfaces: GSSName,
GSSCredential, and GSSContext. These interfaces are described below with the methods
to instantiate their implementations.
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The GSSName Interface
Sun's implementation of the GSSName interface is a container class. Implementation of
GSSName is similar to the principal set stored in a Subject. It may even contain the same
elements that are in a Subject's principal set, but its use is restricted in the context of Java
GSS-API [12]. For instance a Kerberos V5 mechanism provider might map this name to
Bob@SERVER.COM where SERVER.COM is the local Kerberos realm.

The GSSCredential Interface
This interface encapsulates the credentials owned by one entity. The Server's credential
requested is one that can accept incoming requests [12]. Moreover, servers are typically
long lived and like to request a longer lifetime for the credentials. The secret key of the
server is stored as an instance of a subclass of javax.security.auth.kerberos.KerberosKey.

The GSSContext Interface
The GSSContext is an interface whose implementation provides security services to the
two peers [12]. This returns an initialized security context on the acceptor's side. At this
point it does not know the name of the peer (client) that will send a context establishment
request or even the underlying mechanism that will be used. However, if the incoming
request is not for service principal represented by the credentials serverCreds, or the
underlying mechanism requested by the client side does not have a credential element in
serverCreds, then the request will fail.
Before the GSSContext can be used for its security services, it has to be
established with an exchange of tokens between the two peers. Each call to the context
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establishment methods will generate a token that the application must send to its peer.
Once the security context is established, it can be used for message protection.

3.3.4 Receive Class
➢ Receive Class
Extends: Thread
This class is called as a thread to receive the messages from the server. The messages are
encrypted with Kerberos protocol sub-session keys. However, the Java GSS-API
provides both message integrity and message confidentiality. The wrap method is used to
encapsulate a clear text message in a token such that its integrity and privacy are
protected. The original clear text is returned by the peer's unwrap method when the token
is passed to it. The properties object on the unwrap side returns information about
whether the message was simply integrity protected or whether it was encrypted as well.
It also contains sequencing and duplicates token warnings.

CHAPTER 4
SOFTWARE PERFORMANCE AND POWER ANALYSIS

Mobile phones have critical parameters which must be considered carefully when
designing applications for this limited computing platform. These parameters mainly fall
into three categories: power, processing capabilities, and memory. This chapter studies
these parameters and focuses on code performance, space requirements and power
consumption.
The Sun Java Wireless Toolkit for Connected Limited Device Configuration
(CLDC) [13] provides several tools to monitor the behavior of the applications. These
tools are helpful in debugging and optimizing the code:
•

The profiler lists the frequency of use and execution time for every method in
the application.

•

The memory monitor shows the usage of memory while your application runs.

•

The network monitor shows network data transmitted and received by the
application.

•

Tracing outputs low-level information to the toolkit console.

4.1 Performance
The performance of the application is a very critical parameter. Mobile phones have
limited processing power. Kerberos Secure Phone Messenger (KSPM) is designed
carefully to perform all the tasks with the best possible performance.
The profiler (Figure 4.1) keeps track of every method in the application. For a
particular run, it Figures out how much time was spent in each method and how many
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times each method was called. After running the application the pro filer pops up allowing
to browse through the method call information.
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:il"W (1.43%) KerberosClient. getAuthenticationHeacier
~" '64 (0.03%) KerberosClient.getNoNetworkBindings
.• (0.0%) TicketAndKey.getKey
. "...• (0.0%) TicketAndKey.getTlCket
41' W (4.07%) KerberosClient.getTicketAndKey
4l"@]j (0.0%)KerberosClient.getSecretKey

rfl ,¥.3 (0,0%) TicketAndKey . <init>
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·@]j (1I.56%)KerberosCHent.getTicketResponse

[t! ,,~ (3.73%) KerberosCHent.setParameters
(3.86%) com ,sun ,midp,main,Main,main ...

(0.01 %) J2MEClientMIDleLstartApp

Figure 4.1 Pro filer.

The profiler results show that the application executes a total of 9,630,347 VM
instructions. For further analysis, the profiler also shows the cycles required for each
method. Based on these statistics the analysis is done in the rest of this section.

4.1.1 Distribution of CPU Cycles
Figure 4.2 compares the percentage of CPU cycles used by the main parts in the program.
Network's stream connection consumes the largest percentage 62% out of the whole
program execution time. Network's socket streams are the most demanding resource in
the application. These streams use TCP connection to exchange data. TCP is a complex
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protocol; this complexity is a price for the reliability of the protocol. On the other hand,
UDP protocol is totally efficient in phone' s application because it does not use streams.
Kerberos protocol comes in the second place consuming 23% of the application
execution time. The main processing overhead in the protocol comes from the encryption
complexity for secure algorithms. Yet symmetric key cryptography complexity is
acceptable, if compared to public key cryptography. Kerberos has a big advantage over
other protocols because of symmetric key efficiency. The rest of the execution time
(15%) is used for loading the application, initiating the classes and displaying the
interface.

Distribution of CPU Cycles

iii Netw ork Stream
Connection

- -- - ---

- -----,

Gil Network Stream

Connection
• Kerberos

lOOther (Run, Display)
o Other (Run,

"

Display)
15%

Figure 4.2 Distribution of CPU cycles used by the main parts in the program.
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Figure 4.3 studies the percentage of CPU cycles for main routines in Kerberos
protocol. These routines represent the high level of interface for Kerberos. Each routine
has a specific function explained in the earlier chapter. These routines take up to 23% of
the execution time as explained in the Figure above. The Figure shows that six routines
require almost 11.5% of the application total execution time. However, the function
getTicketResponse requires another 11.5% of the application total execution time.

Obviously, this function has a large overhead when compared to other functions for two
reasons. First, the function is being executed three times while other functions are
executed

one

time

each.

Second,

the

function

uses

the

system

method

java.lang.System.arraycopy which is called 67 times taking 5.6% of the execution time.
This function copies an array from the specified source array, beginning at the specified
position, to the specified position of the destination array. Thus, .this method is called
many times because encryption streams use arrays frequently.
Percentage of CPU cycles for Kerberos Routines
12
10

Routines

Figure 4.3 Percentage of CPU cycles for main routines in Kerberos protocol.
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4.1.2 Execution Time
The application executes a total of 9,630,347 VM instructions. The number of
instructions is dependent on the target processor. In this analysis, an assumption made is
that the number of VM instructions is equal to the number of instructions actually
executed on the target processor. Thus, the analysis is based on estimation and real values
can differ slightly. The execution time can be calculated using Equation 4.1, provided
that the phone's execution MIPS (Million Instructions per Second) rate is known, which
is normally true.

CPU time (in seconds) = Number of Instructions (in millions)/ MIPS

(4.1)

Figure 4.4 shows the estimated execution time for the application on three
different ARM processors [14] ARM7, ARM9 and XScale. Clearly, phones with high
clock rates are faster. The execution time is smallest when executed on ARM XScale
(624 MHz) processor. Table 4.1 shows the processors performance details and the
estimated execution time for the VM instructions on these processors.

Table 4.1 Estimated Execution Time on Three Different Processors.

Source: Wikipedia, "ARM Architecture," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARM_architecture.
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Estimated Execution Time for VM Instructions
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Figure 4.4 Estimated execution time (for VM instructions) on three different processors.

Figure 4.5 shows the estimated execution time for the three major parts in the
application using 200MHz processor executing 220MIPS. The longest processing time
(27ms) is being spent in network stream connection as explained in the section before.

Estimated Execution Time (for VM Instructions)
Assuming a 200MHz Processor Executin 220MIPS
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25

+i

20

t: -

~

E 15

(.)

10

::JC1>

><
w

5

o
Network
Connection
Stream

Kerberos

Other( Run,
Display)

Application parts

Figure 4.5 Estimated execution time for major application parts assuming a 200MHz
processor executing 220MIPS. Direct implementation ofVM instructions is assumed.
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4.2

Memory Requirements

Memory is scarce on many mobile devices. Usually, the critical memory is the RAM. At
the time of writing this document, the average RAM size equals 64MB and the flash
memory size can range from 64MB to 1GB or more. The applications are loaded to the
RAM at run time from the flash memory. The operating system (Windows Mobile 5.0)
requires about 20 MB from the RAM. Thus, only two thirds of the RAM size will be free
for user's applications.
The Sun Java Wireless Toolkit includes a memory monitor (Figure 4.6) that
makes it easy to examine the memory usage of the application. It shows the total memory
used by the application and a detailed listing of the memory usage per object.

(2.18%) java.lang.dass.runCustomCodeO
(97.38%) com.sun.midp.kduLDefauitEventHandler$QueuedEventHardler.run()
~···tJ (97.:J801.) com.sun.midp.lcdU.DefaultEventHandler$QueuedEventHandler.handleVmEvent(I)

Si. ·€J (97.38%) com.sun.midp.lcdui.AutomatedEventHandIer.cOlMlandEvent(I)
E,-a (97.38%) com.sun.midp.lcdui .DefaulEventHandler.corrmandEvent(I)
5i '0 (97.38%) javax .microedition .lcdui .Display$DisplayManagerI~. cummandAction(I)
S;

a (97.38%) javax. microedition.lcdui.Display$DispiayAccessor.commandAction(I)

8"'0 (97.38%) J2MEClientMIDIet.commandAction(Ljavax.microedition.lcdui.Command;, Ljavax.microedition.lcd'-'.Displayab~;)
5:;"0 .(97.38%) J2MECtientMIDlet.sendMoneyO
:i;.;

'0 (97.38%) KerberosClient.setParameters(Ljava.lang.String;, ljava.lang.String;, Ljava.lang.strln<,j;)
[£ ... .;. (3.05%) KerberosKey. <init>(Ljava.lanQ.5tring;, Ljava.lang.String;, Ljava.lang.Striny;)

[~ .•> (91.33"10) Kerberosdient.ge\TicketResponse(Ljava.lang.String;, Ljav• .lang.5tring;, Ljav •. Iar,g.str'l9;, byte[],

1£ .;. (0.29%) ASNID.t.Types.getIntegerBytes(I)

I'lWl ~lHiiltbm~~~~
.~
. ~

Figure 4.6 Memory monitor.

$ ... .;. (0.87%) ASNlDataTypes.getT.gAndLengthBytes(I, I, byte[])
!iii"'';' (0.11%) ASNIDat.Types .getBitstrinQBytes(byte[ D
r:r; " (8.57%) ASNlDataTypes .getGenera!StringBytes(Ljav•. lang.String;)
!±;.C;) (7.19%) KerberosClient.getTlCketAndKey(byte[], byte[])
i£"';' (56.16 01.) KerberosCient.getTicketResponse(Ljava.lang.string;, Ljava.lang.string;, Ljava.lang.String;,
[# " (i'I.38%) KerberosCIient.createKerberosSession(byte[], Ljava.lang.Strng;, Ljava.lang.string;, I,
$ ..." (1.72%) KerberosCient.sendSecureMessage(Ljava.lang.String;, byte(], I, Ljava.io. D..ta!rjlUt5tream;,
1£..." (1.59%) Kerberosdent.decodeSecureMessage(byte[], byte[])
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The application size once it is launched is 67,928 Bytes. Then, the application size
changes depending on the called functions. Each function requires allocating dynamic
memory from the heap at run time. The size becomes 186,228 Bytes when all Kerberos
routines are executed. After the authentication is done, the size drops again to 78,340
Bytes. This drop can be achieved only if garbage data is disposed correctly.
Another important fact when running the application on windows mobile
operating system is that it uses a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to convert the code to
machine code. The major memory requirement is going to be the JVM size (Figure 4.7).
The only available smartphone JVM in the market is WebSphere Everyplace Micro
Edition Java (WEME) by IBM [9]. WEME or J9 at run time allocates 4 MB of memory
or more depending on the available free memory. On the other hand, when running the
application on ajava operating system the VM will be already included.
- - - -- - - -- -- - - -- -

JVM vs. Application Size

JVM
95%

III JVM

• Application

Application
5%

Figure 4.7 JVM vs. application size.
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Analyzing the memory requirement for the major routines in Kerberos (Figure
4.8) is important to optimize these main routines. The function getTicketResponse
requires about 45KB of memory. Obviously this function seizes a large space when
compared to other functions. This same function requires the longest execution time as
explained before. This is because the function is being executed three times while other
functions are executed one time each. It also requires a largest size of byte arrays because
encryption streams use arrays frequently.

Data Types Allocation for Routines
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iii'
~
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.~ 20
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o Boolean[]
iii i nt[ ]

o

fII byte[ ]
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Figure 4.8 Data types allocation for Kerberos routines.

4.3

Power Consumption

ARM CPUs are dominant in the mobile electronics market, where low power
consumption is a critical design goal. Analysis shows that the application will consume
less than lOOmW. The major power consumption in smart phones comes from the
wireless connections.

52
Table 4.2 ARM Processor Power Consumption for the Application

Source: Wikipedia, "ARM Architecture," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARM_architecture.

Table 4.2 shows the estimated power consumption for the application on three
different ARM processors. The MIPS/W ratio for ARM7, ARM9, and XScale processors
is obtained respectively from [15, 16, 17]. This ratio gives a clear indication of the
processor's performance and power consumption at the same time, independent from the
processor's clock rate. Providing that the number of VM generated instructions equals
9630347, the power can be calculated using the MIPS/W ratio. As stated earlier, the
number of instructions is dependent on the target processor. An assumption is made that
the number of VM instructions is equal to the number of instructions being executed on
the real processor. Thus, the analysis is based on estimations and real values can differ
slightly. The power values are calculated using Equation 4.2, where the resulting unit is
watts per second.

Power = Number of Instructions / (MIPS/W)

(4.2)

Figure 4.9 shows the estimated power consumption for the application on three
different ARM processors. Power values are calculated in Table 4.2. Results clearly
indicate that the higher the clock rate, the higher the power consumption.
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Figure 4.9 Estimated power consumption for the application using VM instructions.

Numerous factors affect the battery lifetime of a smart phone. Despite the fact that
each application that runs on the phone contributes differently to its battery drain, there
are five fundamental hardware components that consume most of the power: backlight,
Bluetooth, CPU, WiFi, and the cell radio. Figure 4.10 illustrates the hardware component
distribution of power consumption for an average user [18]. As observed, the processor
consumes less power than the WiFi and the GSM radio. However, power analysis in
depends on estimations because phones run in different modes. The phone idle time
consumes very little power, while making calls is power demanding. Figure 4.10 assumes
a rough estimate for the percentages of time when a typical user makes phone calls,
browses the Internet, uses Bluetooth headset, plays games, or plays media files.
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Figure 4.10 Hardware component distribution of power consumption [18] .

4.4

Network Performance

The network monitor tool (Figure 4.11) provides a simple way to observe network data
exchange. This is helpful in debugging network interactions or looking for ways to
optimize network traffic. When the application makes any type of network connection,
information about the connection is captured and displayed. The Figure 4.11 shows
datagrams requests and responses. The display on the left side shows a hierarchy of
messages and message pieces. The details are in the right side of the network monitor.
Message bodies are shown as raw hexadecimal values and the equivalent text.
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Figure 4.11 Network monitor.

The execution time has network delays to consider. The exchange of messages
over the network has a certain delay depending on the network itself. Kerberos
authentication is highly affected by this. The authentication process has to exchange with
the server about six messages before the secure channel is established. This delay is also
dependant on the server speed, as the server needs to decrypt the messages and
authenticate the user. The delay by the server can be ignored for now, assulning the
server is fast and its processing time is negligible if compared with the phone.
Figure 4.12 shows the sequence of Kerberos authentication messages labeled by
their size as noticed by the network monitor. All packets have a small size. The delay for
exchanging these packets is negligible. The Round Trip Time (RTT) is less than
microseconds in a LAN and less than 11 ms on average for 1KB packets in the internet
[19]. Hence, the delay of network can be ignored in small networks as in N JIT.

56
If the size of Kerberos messages is larger than 1500 bytes, fragmentation will
occur. Usually, the size is less than 1500 bytes unless long authorization lists are included
in the message. If this happens, windows server will replace the UDP connection with a
TCP connection to exchange the authentication messages [20]. This will require more
resources from the phone. As a result, the messages size should not exceed the limit,
otherwise noticeable delays will arise.
Time synchronization restrictions in Kerberos add an extra step in authentication
message exchange. This step arises very frequently when authenticating with windows
adding more delays [20]. Usually Kerberos allows five minutes skew between the server
and the client. This problem can be solved by using network time protocol to synchronize
the clock for all computers on the network.
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1. KRB AS REQ - 131Bytes

2. KRB AS REP - 580Bytes
Alice
3. KRB TGS REQ - 553Bytes

KDC
(Active
Directory)

Error (time sync required) - 86Bytes
Send again 3. KRB_TGS_REQ - 553Bytes

4. KRB TGS REP - 512Bytes
5. KRB AP REQ - 231 Bytes
Server
Application
6. KRB AP REP — 572Bytes

Figure 4.12 Kerberos messages exchange showing messages size.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

5.1 Conclusions
Internet enabled mobile devices are widely spreading while security is still not maturely
addressed for such platforms. Therefore, this research implements a novel Kerberos
Secure Phone Messenger (KSPM) extending the popular Kerberos authentication
protocol to run on mobile phones. Moreover, the Kerberos network authentication
protocol provides user authentication and message privacy with the convenience of secret
key cryptography to reduce the computational burden and power consumption if
compared with public key cryptography. KSPM analysis shows that the application
performance and power consumption is very practical on the commonly used mobiles
empowered by ARM processors. Hence, KSPM can provide outstanding secure services
for corporate users by protecting their workplace network and all other mobile
communications.

5.2 Future Research
Further analysis can be done for the performance of the application using Java dedicated
hardware processors. Predictions show that major improvements can occur if using such
processors to run the application.
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5.2.1 Java Hardware Processors
A program written in a language that is designed to run on a virtual machine (VM) is
usually compiled to a pseudo-assembler bytecode language. This bytecode is then
downloaded and executed on the target device within a virtual execution environment,
such as a Java VM. The interpretation of bytecode in software maps individual Java
bytecodes to machine instruction sequences. This is efficient in terms of memory
footprint requirements, but the interpretation process severely limits performance.
However, direct execution of Java bytecode in hardware, significantly boosts
performance, as the bytecode effectively becomes the native instruction set. A key benefit
of interpretation techniques is that execution of the application is immediate in other
words there is no start-up delay [21]. Such examples of java hardware processors are
PicoJava II and ARM Jazelle DBX.

PicoJava II
PicoJava II [22] is a 32-bit stack based Java processor purposed by Sun Microsystems.
Microprocessor specifications are dedicated to native execution of Java-based bytecode
without the need for an interpreter or JIT compiler, thus speeding bytecode execution
many times, compared to standard CPU with a JVM [23]. This approach results in the
fastest Java runtime performance with a small memory footprint and competitive
performance.
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ARM Jazelle DBX
ARM Jazelle DBX (Direct Bytecode eXecution) technology [24] enables hardware direct
bytecode execution of Java. Jazelle DBX technology typically increases the performance
of a highly optimized commercial JVM by around 2 and 4 times when running
benchmarks or complex MIDP 2.0 applications. In addition, all Java bytecodes are
restartable, so there is no overhead on real-time performance. When looking at Java on
embedded devices, raw speed performance is not the only factor to consider. Power
consumption, memory usage (RAM and ROM), ease of integration, system cost and user
experience are all equally important and achieving the right balance between each of
these constraints is essential.

Application Performance on Java Hardware Processors
For future research, studying the performance of the application on java hardware
processors is very important. Such processors can provide major improvements in the
application performance and memory requirements. The most important reason of
performance improvement is that each bytecode instruction requires one cycle to execute
on average. However, mapping the bytecode instructions to the processor's ISA will
result in instructions requiring multiple cycles to execute. Furthermore, the size of
bytecode instructions is less than the size of the processor's instructions. Hence, the
memory requirements are less.

APPENDIX A
AUTHENTICATION SERVICE EXCHANGE MESSAGES

1) KRB_AS_REQ Message Contents (Authentication Service Request)
The initial message sent to the AS requesting a TGT is the KRB_AS_REQ message.

Table A.1 Authentication Service Request Message Fields [6]
Field

Description

Protocol Version 5
Message Type KRB _AS _REQ
Preauthentication
Data

The intent of these fields is to provide pre-authentication before the
KDC sends the client a ticket. This is to prevent brute force or
dictionary attacks on the user's password. Note that these fields are
used in the KRB TGS REQ message for the TGT and the
authenticator.

PAData Type

PA-AS-REQ or PA-PK-AS-REQ.

PAData Value

The AS REQ includes a client timestamp encrypted with the user
key. In this case, the data type will be PA-AS-REQ.

Request Body
KDC Options

The client can request that the TGT have certain optional features.
The KDC options are detailed in the table below.

Client Name

Name of the requester.

Realm

Realm (Active Directory domain) of the requester.

Server Name

In the KRB AS REQ, this will be the KDC name. The client is
specifically requesting a ticket for the TGS.

From

(Optional) If the ticket were postdated (not supported by
Windows 2000, but is supported in Windows Server 2003), this field
would specify the time from which the ticket would be valid.

Till

This is the requested expiration time. The KDC does not have to
honor this request if the requested expiration time violates the
domain's Kerberos policy.

Renew Time

(Optional) The requested renewal time.
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Field

Description

Nonce

A random number generated by the client. The nonce can be used as
the basis for sequence numbering or as an additional authenticator.
The nonce supplied here will be returned in the encrypted portion of
the KRB_AS_REP message. The client will compare the nonces to
make sure they match.

Encryption Type The desired encryption algorithm to be used.
Addresses

IP addresses from which ticket will be valid.

Encrypt
Authorization
Data

Not used for KRB AS REQ.

Additional
Tickets

Not used for KRB AS REQ.

2) KRB_AS_REP Message Contents (Authentication Service Response)
This same structure is used for both the KRB_AS_REP message and the KRB_TGS_REP
message. Thus, the field contents might change depending on the message type.

Table A.2 Authentication. Server Reply Message Fields [6]
Field

Description

Protocol
Version

5

Message Type KRB_AS_REP
Preauthentication
data

For the KRB_AS_REP message, this field will normally be empty.

Client Realm

Realm or domain of the requester.

Client Name

Name of the requester.

Ticket

The encrypted ticket is placed here. For the KRB_AS_REP message,
this will be the TGT encrypted with the TGS's secret key.
The rest of the message fields are encrypted with the user's key.
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Field

Description
The client cannot read the encrypted ticket and might need to verify the
ticket information. Furthermore, the client needs to have information
about start times and end times so it can determine when to request
renewal or replacement tickets. Therefore, the seven fields from
Authentication Time to Client Addresses are all included in the ticket
and copied here into these fields.

Key

This is the session key the user will use to encrypt and decrypt TGS
messages.

Last Requested The last time a ticket was requested. This is similar to a "last logged
on" time. This can be used to track how frequently a client is requesting
tickets. A Kerberos policy can be set that limits how frequently ticket
requests can be made. Such limits can help prevent brute force attacks.
Nonce

The nonce from the KRB AS REQ nonce field will be copied here.

Key Expiration When the user's key will expire. This is used for password aging.
Flags

These are the flags set in the ticket, based on the flags requested in the
KRB AS REQ message and the domain's Kerberos policy.

Authentication The time the ticket was issued.
Time
Start Time

(Optional) At what time the ticket is valid.

End Time

At what time the ticket expires (although it can be renewed if the ticket
is renewable).

Renew Till

(Optional) At what time the ticket absolutely expires (cannot be
renewed past this time).

Server Realm

Requested server's realm (domain).

Server Name

Requested server's name

Client
Addresses

(Optional) Addresses from which the ticket will be valid. This is
important in several situations. Normally, a ticket is only valid if sent
from a specific address.

3) KRB TGS REQ Message Contents (The Ticket-Granting Service Request)
_REQ message is similar to the KRB _
The KRB_
TGS
AS_REQ message. The only
difference is the pre-authentication field (PAData Type and PAData Value). The TGT
and the authenticator are placed in the PAData Value field. The authenticator is encrypted
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with the session key. The TGT is encrypted with the TGS's secret key (the key based on
the krbtgt user account). A checksum is computed using the contents of fields in the
request body, and that checksum is encrypted within the authenticator. The following
table lists and describes the fields used in the ticket-granting service request message.

Table A.3 Ticket-Granting Service Request Message Fields [6]
Field

Description

Protocol Version 5
Message Type KRB TGS REQ
Preauthentication
Data

The intent of these fields is to provide some authentication before the
KDC sends the client a ticket. This is to prevent brute force or
dictionary attacks on the user password. Note that this field is used in
the KRB TGS REQ message for the TGT and the authenticator.

PAData Type

PA-TGS-REQ

PAData Value

TGT and authenticator.

Request Body
KDC Options

The client can request that the ticket have certain optional features.

Client Name

(Optional) Name of the requester.

Realm

Realm or domain of the requester.

Server Name

(Optional) Requested server name.

From

(Optional) If the ticket were postdated (not supported by
Windows 2000, but supported in Windows Server 2003), this field
would specify the time from which the ticket would be valid.

Till

This is the requested expiration time. The KDC does not have to
honor this request, if the requested expiration time violates the
domain's Kerberos policy.

Renew Time

(Optional) The requested renewal time.

Nonce

A random number generated by the client. The nonce can be used as
the basis for sequence numbering or as an additional authenticator.
The nonce supplied here will be returned in the encrypted portion of
the KRB TGS REP message. The client will compare the nonces to
make sure they match.
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Field

Description

Encryption Type The desired encryption algorithm to be used.
Addresses

(Optional) IP addresses from which ticket will be valid.

Encrypt
Authorization
Data

(Optional) In the KRB_TGS_REQ message, this will specify a key to
use to encrypt any pre-authentication data.

Additional
Tickets

(Optional) In a KRB_TGS_REQ for user-to-user authentication, a
TGT will be included in this field. The TGS will use the session key
from this TGT
instead of the service's secret key
to encrypt the
service ticket.

4) KRB _TGS _REP Message Contents (Ticket-Granting Service Response)
The KRB _ TGS _REP and KRB AS REP messages are similar and the fields are
similarly used. The major difference is that the ticket in the Ticket field is not a TGT.
Instead, it is the service ticket for the target server.

Table A.4 Ticket-Granting Server Reply Message Fields [6]
Field

Description

Protocol
Version

5

Message Type KRB_TGS_REP
Preauthentication
Data

In a KRB _ TGS _REP message, application-specific data might be
placed here.

Client Realm

Realm or domain of the requester.

Client Name

Name of the requester

Ticket

The encrypted ticket is placed here. For the KRB_TGS_REP message,
this will be the service ticket encrypted with the target server's secret
key.
The message fields below are encrypted with the TGS session key.

Key

This is the session key the user will use with the application server.
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Field

Description

Last Requested The last time a ticket was requested. This is similar to a "last logged
on" time. This can be used to track how frequently a client is
requesting tickets. A Kerberos policy can be set that limits how
frequently ticket requests can be made. Such limits can help prevent
brute force attacks.
Nonce

The nonce from the KRB TGS REQ nonce field will be copied here.

Key Expiration (Optional) When the user's key will expire. This is used for password
aging.
Flags

These are the flags set in the ticket, based on the flags requested in the
KRB TGS REQ message and on the domain's Kerberos policy.

Authentication The time the ticket was issued.
Time
Start Time

(Optional) At what time the ticket is valid.

End Time

At what time the ticket expires (although it can be renewed if the ticket
is renewable).

Renew Till

(Optional) At what time the ticket absolutely expires (cannot be
renewed past this time).

Server Realm

Requested server's realm (domain).

Server Name

Requested server's name.

Client
Addresses

(Optional) Addresses from which the ticket will be valid.

5) KRB _ AP _REQ Message Contents (Application Server Request)
The KRB AP REQ message contains an authenticator encrypted with the session key
that the client and target server share, the service ticket encrypted with the target server's
secret key, and the optional mutual authentication request.

Table A.5 Application Server Request Message Fields [6]
Field

Description

Protocol Version

5
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Field

Description

Message Type

KRB _AP _REQ

Application
Options Fields
Use Session Key

During user-to-user authentication, after the client has obtained a
new ticket for the target service, the client will send a new
KRB _AP _REQ with this flag set. This tells the target service to use
its session key to decrypt the ticket.

Mutual
Authentication
Required

If this flag is set, the target server will respond with the
KRB AP REP message, which will authenticate the target server to
the client.

Other Message
Fields
Ticket

The service ticket for the target server, encrypted in either the target
server's secret key or in its session key, depending on whether userto-user authentication is required.

Authenticator

The client's timestamp and other data, encrypted with the session
key that the client and target server share.

6) KRB _ AP _REP Message Contents (Application Server Response)
This message is used when mutual authentication is required (if the client needs to verify
the target server's identity). The message consists of a copy of the client's timestamp from
the authenticator that was previously included in the KRB_AP_REQ message encrypted
with the session key that the client and the target server share.

Table A.6 Application Server Reply Message Fields [6]
Field

Description

Protocol
Version

5

Message Type KRB_AP_REP
The following message fields are encrypted with the session key
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Field

Description

Client Time

Current time on Client (from the authenticator).

CUSEC

Millisecond part of client time (from the authenticator).

Subkey

(Optional) Specifies a key to encrypt client sessions with application
server.

Sequence
Number

(Optional) Application-specific, so used if sequence number was
specified in the authenticator.

APPENDIX B
SOFTWARE OPERATIONS

This appendix describes the operations of the program. It describes briefly how KSPM
works and what is required to establish a connection. Snapshots from the program are
displayed.
Running KSPM on the phone requires WebSphere Everyplace Micro Edition Java
(WEME) to be installed on the phone. On the other hand, the messenger server requires a
Java runtime compiler to be installed on the server.
KSPM connection parameters such as user name, user password, realm, server
name, server IP address and service ports must be known in order to establish the
connection. Parameters like user name, user password, and realm are inserted at run time
by the GUI interface. Other parameters like the server IP address and port number are
hard-coded. Before the connection takes place, the user name and password should be
already stored in Active Directory at the server. The messenger server should be running
before launching KSPM to complete the connection establishment.
In Figure B.1, two clients (Bob and Alice) are using KSPM to exchanging
messages. The program is running using an emulator. Connection information is
displayed in the chatting screen for testing purposes. Figure B.2 shows the Messenger
Server functioning as an intermediate point between clients. It also logs chat sessions if
required.
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Bob: Hello
A.li ce : Hi

I

User Name lad min

~:::::::;::::::::;::::::::::

"IPassword 10

' IEBA~'JK..LOCAL
IP Address 1192.168.1.50

I
I
I

User Natne ladrnin

;:::::::::::::::::::::::~

IPassw ord 10
IEBAJ\lK. LOCAL

:J

:================;
1
Send
.

Figure B.I Two clients using KSPM to exchanging messages.
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EBANKServer starts ... Waiting for incoming connection
EBANKServer starts ... Waiting for incoming connection
BANKServer... client connection received
B.ANKServer.... cl ient co nnection received
I [Bob: Hello I receivedl
[Alice: Hi I received

Figure B.2 Messenger Server as an intermediate point between clients.
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